For more than four decades, Article 36 of the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions has been considered as a norm for assessing the legality of new weapons. The criteria included in this article are based on weapons that were in existence at the time of its adoption. New technologies have brought new weapons which challenged the existing norms. Cyberspace as one of these technologies has capabilities that are used in software or malware forms for causing damages or injuries in the armed conflicts. The question posed here is whether Article 36 of the Additional Protocol I can regulate such capabilities under international humanitarian law? Due to the novelty of these capabilities and the difficulty of naming them as weapons, their legal review is faced with challenges in the light of Article 36 of the Additional Protocol. The review of Article 36, along with the nature of cyberspace capabilities shows that their legal assessment faces challenges such as the lack of rules and regulations that explicitly prohibits or allows explicitly the use of cyberspace, entrusting the definition of weapons to the member States of the Protocol, the definition of new weapons, the non-application of the object to computer data for the perceived cyber-weapons as a weapon, the lack of an international consensus on the virtual effects of the use of cybercriminals, the lack of regulation on the requirement for individuals and groups to produce cyber weapons for legal assessment, and most importantly, the interconnection of military and civilian networks and the possible use of cyber-weapons likely to infect critical civilian networks. Therefore, respecting the fundamental principles of International Humanitarian Law including distinction, proportionality, military necessity, and precautionary measures will be difficult.

War is a phenomenon in which the damage is inevitable and one of the significant losses during armed conflict is the environment. In this respect, humanitarian law protects and takes account of the environment in a few of its regulations. However, these regulations have not given sufficient support to the environment and the question arises whether any prohibitions available in international environmental law are applicable to environmental protection in this case, or should we only use the provisions contained in humanitarian international law for this. In this paper we consider these regulations and the possibility of applying of them to protecting the environment in the event of armed conflict. Damage to the environment during armed conflict may occur intentionally or unintentionally. Intentional damage to the environment occurs when the environment is used as a weapon or damage to the environment is deliberate, but the environment is not used as a weapon. Regulations that have been enacted to protect against these damages contain certain conditions and the fulfilment of these conditions is necessary for incurring damage. Regarding unintentional damage to the environment, the main victim is not the environment, however, and the precautionary principle should be applied. In this regard, it is necessary to consider types of losses, existing prohibitions and possibility of minimizing environmental losses.

Since the launch of the world's first ballistic missile, the nature of warfare has changed forever, with profound military and political developments around the world. Ballistic missiles made it possible for a nation to move away from the battlefield and, with the relative immunity gained, to strike deep into enemy territory and inflict heavy losses. The hallmark of the ballistic missile index is its ability to carry heavy nuclear warheads weighing 40 megatons, which, in addition to its 12, 000-kilometer range, has raised concerns among international powers. To this end, in the absence of consideration of specific international rules, they have made political and exclusive decisions about the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the use of this weapon. What is considered in this study is the answer to the legal status of ballistic missiles in international humanitarian law. The findings of the study indicate that, despite the legal nature of ballistic missiles, the assessment of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the use of this weapon depends on the examination of experimental data from each missile exercise, which does not provide a general conclusion about the legal status of ballistic missiles. The experimental data of the launch missile should be reviewed and verified.

The threshold of non-international armed conflicts is a criterion in terms of which the internal disturbances and tensions e.g. riots, and both isolated and sporadic acts of violence, are no longer characterized as civil wars. This term was introduced into the literature of International Law in 1949, following the formation of the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The impact of the above-mentioned concept is directly in connection with the sovereign rights of States, particularly the exclusive jurisdiction of the national judicial authorities. Consequently, its effect on managing the conflicts and dealing with the operations of anti-government armed forces, has always been one of the most controversial parts of different diplomatic conferences, including those led to the creation of the Common Article 3, Article 8 of the Rome Statute and especially the Additional Protocol II to Geneva conventions.

Military necessity is an important concept in both jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Jus ad bellum refers to the legal norms which restrict the circumstances in which states can resort to the use of force, while jus in bello refers to the placing of limits on the manner in which hostilities are conducted. In the past, it was often claimed that a belligerent party is at liberty to deviate from the law of international armed conflict when military necessity so demanded. This claim, which actually means that military necessity is superior to the law, is now completely defunct. At present, it is indisputable that if ‘ necessity knows no law’ , then there is no law. At present military necessity can only be considered as an exception to the humanitarian rules, but of course there is some requirements for this exception that military necessity cannot be achieved without them.

Through the peaceful settlement of disputes outlook, the Joint Comprehensive of Action (JCPOA) deals with as a turning point. The issue of granting access to and monitoring via JCPOA on the Iran’ s nuclear activities is growing increasingly sensitive in Iran. Incorporating two specific mechanism in JCPOA, routine and unannounced inspection, upon which the International Energy Atomic Agency (IAEA) is rested with to monitor such an access. The routine inspection in JCPOA is similar to an extent degree to the same inspection included in the IAEA monitoring system of the Safeguard Agreement, Additional Protocol and the modified Code 3. 1. The innovation has been occurred in the JCPOA is pertained to the transparence-derived activities. The challenging, and somehow discriminating, point which may be made here is that the unannounced inspections in the JCPOA is capable of offering an adequate facilitation for potential leaking of Iran’ s nuclear confidential information. With regard to reviewing JCPOA’ s contents, the paper would make an examination to the related instruments in order to reach a conclusion as to the question how the method and qualification of access in the JCPOA would be.

The paper illustrates the provisions of the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement, Additional Protocol and JCPOA, in terms of the inspectors’ access to military sites and the restrictions thereof. The NPT and the comprehensive safeguard agreements have not envisaged any discretionary power for the IAEA regarding the access to military sites of the States Parties. Neither the Addition Protocol has foreseen such a right. JCPOA has a sophisticated and clear provisions but not a right to access to military sites and any such an access is subject to consent and voluntary cooperation of Iran.

In contrast to other ancillary suits (such as competing claims, compulsory presence of a third party, and intervention of a third party), there are no particular regulations in the Iranian Civil Procedural Law to define principles and rules govering “additional claim”. The word “additional” within the context of this term has two meanings. Its general meaning includes any change in the essential elements of the claim, the purpose of the claim, and the reason for the claim, which generally known as “changes in the claim”. In its specific meaning, it refers to a claim submitted under a new demand which is attached to the original claim due to its relation to the original claim. Accordingly, this paper analyses the concept, necessity, conditions and rules govering the additional claim in order to clarify the existing ambiguous points, differences and similarities with the changes in the claim.